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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS R. COOK,
Plaint iff-Appellant,
Case No. 860511

vs
CHRISTIANSEN BROTHERS, INC., a
Utah corporation; MONTMORENCY
HAYES AND TALBOT ARCHITECTS,
INC, a Utah corporation; MHT
ARCHITECTS, INC., a Utah
corporation; and HALVERSON
PLUMBING AND HEATING, INC.,

Priority No. 13(b)

Defendants-Respondents
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law
that the design and construction of the drinking fountain was
not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries received in a
fall at his place of employment alleging that negligent design
and construction in the placement of a water fountain proximately caused his injuries.
Defendant Montmorency Hayes and Talbot Architects, Inc.,
filed a third-party complaint against Van Boerum and Frank
Associates.

Defendant MHT Architects was dismissed from the action on
the ground that it was not a proper party.
After taking plaintiff's deposition, defendants moved for
summary judgment arguing that the design, construction and
placement of the water fountain did not proximately cause plaintiffs fall and injuries.

The Honorable David Roth granted

judgment in favor of defendants as a matter of law.

Plaintiff

appeals from that judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was working as the assistant manager of Sears
Automotive Center on November 21, 1981, when he slipped and
fell receiving injuries.

Plaintiff alleges his injuries were

the proximate result of negligent design and construction in
the placement of a drinking fountain in the automotive shop.
[R.I.J
The water fountain was approximately 18 inches away from a
12 inch by 12 inch hole in the floor used as a waste oil
drain.

[R.96, page 5.]

When asked to describe the area in which he fell, plaintiff
testified in his deposition:
A: The general area where the fountain was at there
is a normally a couple of waste oil containers.
Q:

Would you please describe those.
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A: They are about 3 1/2, 4 feet tall and they have a
bucket built on top that you catch the oil in. And
they have a petcock on the bottom and they slide the
oil containers over the hole and open the petcock.
But as I mentioned, the oil containers did seep.
They did leak. And there was oil by the hole and
around the fountain. There was always oil normally in
the shop—the racks, hydraulic racks do leak some too
and there is oil around the racks.
[R.96, page 21, lines 1-13.]
When asked if the floor was slippery, plaintiff testified
in his deposition:
A: Well, a floor in any shop—it doesn't matter where
it's at — is always slick. It doesn't matter where you
are, the least bit of oil or antifreeze is slick. It
doesn't really matter what part of the shop you are in
there is always something on the floor.
Q: And you always have something slippery then on
your boots, then I guess?
A: Yes, I would say so. That's almost a part of the
automotive environment. There is always oil.
[R.96, page 16, lines 19-25, page 17, lines 1 and 2.]
At the time of his fall, plaintiff was walking to the water
fountain to get a drink.

Another worker said something and

plaintiff turned losing his footing.

One foot slid toward the

drain hole and plaintiff fell backward into the fountain.
[R.96, page 7.]
When asked what caused his fall, plaintiff testified in his
deposition:
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A: I don't know for sure whether it was the oil on
the floor or whether it was just my turning around
when the gentleman said something to me. I know it's
the oil that caused the problem when I lost my footing
when I turned.
[R.96, page 21, lines 1-4.]
Plaintiff testified that he would have been in the vicinity
of his fall sometime during the day even if the water fountain
had not been located there:
Q: So even if the drinking fountain hadn't been in
the location that it was, you still would have been in
the vicinity of that oil during the day; is that
correct?
A:

I would say so, yeah.

Q:

Okay.

But everybody is.

A: There is always a certain amount of oil on the
floor.
[R.96, page 56, lines 1-7.]
Plaintiff opposed defendants' motion for summary judgment
by filing an affidavit stating:
3.
The injury would not have happened but for the
fact that the drinking fountain and oil drain were
placed so close to each other than an accident was
inevitable.
4.
I believe the poor placement of the drnking
fountain next to the oil drain was the principal cause
for my injury.
[R. 148.]
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The design, construction and placement of the water fountain in the Sears Automotive Center did not proximately cause
plaintiff's injuries.

Plaintiff testified the entire shop

floor was covered with a certain amount of oil and that he
would have been in the vicinity of his fall that day even if
the water fountain had not been there.
ARGUMENT
THE DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND PLACEMENT OF
THE WATER FOUNTAIN AT THE SEARS AUTOMOTIVE
CENTER WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FALL AND INJURIES.
Plaintiff admits that the entire shop floor was slippery
with oil and antifreeze spills, that the soles of his shoes
were coated with slippery material and that he would have been
in the vicinity of the oil drain hole the day he fell regardless of whether the drinking fountain had been located nearby.
Thus, under the plaintiff's own version of the facts, the
fountain's position did not contribute to his fall.
Even assuming that the fountain was negligently placed in
the vicinity of the oil drain hole, negligence without more
does not create liability.

Plaintiff must also show that defen-

dants' negligence proximately caused the injuries complained
of.

Proximate cause is:
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[T]hat cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause), produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient
cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the
factors that accomplish the injury.
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Utah
1985).
In Mitchell, Donald P. Mitchell was shot and killed in his
hotel room at the Hilton Hotel in Salt Lake City, Utah.
police developed three theories as to what occurred:

The

(1)

Mitchell surprised a burglar who had entered the room with a
pass key and the burglar shot Mitchell to avoid recognition and
apprehension; (2) A robbery had taken place, the robber entering the room either with a pass key or surprising Mitchell in
the elevator or hallway; (3) Mitchell had been executed gangland style, the killer gaining entrance to the room with a pass
key or having accosted Mitchell in the hallway or elevator.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pearson
Enterprises, the operator of the Salt Lake Hilton.

This Court

affirmed stating that even if the hotel was negligent in
providing security, there was no evidence that established a
direct causal connection between the alleged negligence and the
shooting.
In the case at hand the water fountain's location in the
vicinity of plaintiff's fall is not even a cause let alone a
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proximate cause of plaintiff's fall.
fountain did not "produce the injury."

The presence of the water
Plaintiff testified

that he would have been in the area of the oil drain hole in
any event.

Thus, just as in Mitchell there is no evidence

establishing a direct causal link between the water fountain
and plaintiff's fall.

The evidence must do more than merely

raise a conjecture as to the cause of injury.
be allowed to speculate on proximate cause.

The jury may not

When evidence

leaves it to conjecture, which of two possible causes resulted
in injury and the defendant is liable for only one of those
causes, plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law.

Sumison v.

Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 U. 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943).
In Sumison, plaintiffs hired a tow truck to tow their
disabled vehicle.

The tow truck driver failed to use an arm

signal to notify traffic that he was merging from his parked
position into a lane of traffic.
slippery.

Road conditions were

A coal truck slid into the tow truck damaging

plaintiffs vehicle.

The trial court granted defendant's motion

for nonsuit at the close of plaintiffs* evidence.

This Court

affirmed finding that although van arm signal might have
prevented the accident, it was just as likely that the coal
truck driver either saw the tow truck and elected to proceed or
did not see it and would not have seen an arm signal. This
Court stated:
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The evidence must, however, do more than merely raise
a conjecture or show a probability as to the cause of
the injury, and no recovery can be had if the evidence
leaves it to conjecture which of two probable causes
resulted in the injury, where defendant was liable for
only one of them. . . . While deductions may be based
on probabilities, the evidence must do more than
merely raise a conjecture or show a probability.
Where there are probabilities the other way equally or
more potent the deductions are mere guesses and the
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The rule
is well established in this jurisdiction that where
"the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjeeture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter of law."
Id. at 683 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff in the case at hand, is asking the court to allow
a jury to speculate on whether he would have slipped and fallen
if the water fountain had not been nearby.

The law does not

allow such speculation.
Plaintiff filed his affidavit in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment stating "I believe the poor placement of
the drinking fountain next to the oil drain was the principal
cause for my injury".

(Emphasis added.)

The affidavit,

however, does not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Such an affidavit must be made

on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence and show affiant's competence to testify
on the matters referred to. Walker v. Rocky Mountain
Recreation Corp., 29 U.2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973).

Affiant's

beliefs and opinions would be inadmissible testimony at trial.

Therefore, the trial court properly disregarded plaintiff's
affidavit.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, the design, construction and placement
of the water fountain was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries and summary judgment in favor of defendants should be
affirmed.
DATED this /S

day of February, 1987.
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